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Typically, a logic consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-
theoretic semantics. The language has components that correspond to a part of a natural language like English or
Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record arguments that are valid for the given
language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions for at least part of
the language.
The following sections provide the basics of a typical logic, sometimes called “classical elementary logic” or
“classical first-order logic”. Section 2 develops a formal language, with a rigorous syntax and grammar. The
formal language is a recursively defined collection of strings on a fixed alphabet. As such, it has no meaning, or
perhaps better, the meaning of its formulas is given by the deductive system and the semantics. Some of the symbols have counterparts in ordinary
language. We define an argument to be a non-empty collection of sentences in the formal language, one of which is designated to be the conclusion.
The other sentences (if any) in an argument are its premises. Section 3 sets up a deductive system for the language, in the spirit of natural deduction.
An argument is derivable if there is a deduction from some or all of its premises to its conclusion. Section 4 provides a model-theoretic semantics. An
argument is valid if there is no interpretation (in the semantics) in which its premises are all true and its conclusion false. This reflects the longstanding
view that a valid argument is truth-preserving.
In Section 5, we turn to relationships between the deductive system and the semantics, and in particular, the relationship between derivability and
validity. We show that an argument is derivable only if it is valid. This pleasant feature, called soundness, entails that no deduction takes one from true
premises to a false conclusion. Thus, deductions preserve truth. Then we establish a converse, called completeness, that an argument is valid only if it
is derivable. This establishes that the deductive system is rich enough to provide a deduction for every valid argument. So there are enough deductions:
all and only valid arguments are derivable. We briefly indicate other features of the logic, some of which are corollaries to soundness and
completeness.

















Today, logic is a branch of mathematics and a branch of philosophy. In most large universities, both departments offer courses in logic, and there is
usually a lot of overlap between them. Formal languages, deductive systems, and model-theoretic semantics are mathematical objects and, as such, the
logician is interested in their mathematical properties and relations. Soundness, completeness, and most of the other results reported below are typical
examples. Philosophically, logic is at least closely related to the study of correct reasoning. Reasoning is an epistemic, mental activity. So logic is at
least closely allied with epistemology. Logic is also a central branch of computer science, due, in part, to interesting computational relations in logical
systems, and, in part, to the close connection between formal deductive argumentation and reasoning (see the entries on recursive functions,
computability and complexity, and philosophy of computer science).
This raises questions concerning the philosophical relevance of the various mathematical aspects of logic. How do deducibility and validity, as
properties of formal languages--sets of strings on a fixed alphabet--relate to correct reasoning? What do the mathematical results reported below have
to do with the original philosophical issues concerning valid reasoning? This is an instance of the philosophical problem of explaining how
mathematics applies to non-mathematical reality.
Typically, ordinary deductive reasoning takes place in a natural language, or perhaps a natural language augmented with some mathematical symbols.
So our question begins with the relationship between a natural language and a formal language. Without attempting to be comprehensive, it may help
to sketch several options on this matter.
One view is that the formal languages accurately exhibit actual features of certain fragments of a natural language. Some philosophers claim that
declarative sentences of natural language have underlying logical forms and that these forms are displayed by formulas of a formal language. Other
writers hold that (successful) declarative sentences express propositions; and formulas of formal languages somehow display the forms of these
propositions. On views like this, the components of a logic provide the underlying deep structure of correct reasoning. A chunk of reasoning in natural
language is correct if the forms underlying the sentences constitute a valid or deducible argument. See for example, Montague [1974], Davidson
[1984], Lycan [1984] (and the entry on logical form).
Another view, held at least in part by Gottlob Frege and Wilhelm Leibniz, is that because natural languages are fraught with vagueness and ambiguity,
they should be replaced by formal languages. A similar view, held by W. V. O. Quine (e.g., [1960], [1986]), is that a natural language should be
regimented, cleaned up for serious scientific and metaphysical work. One desideratum of the enterprise is that the logical structures in the regimented
language should be transparent. It should be easy to “read off” the logical properties of each sentence. A regimented language is similar to a formal
language regarding, for example, the explicitly presented rigor of its syntax and its truth conditions.
On a view like this, deducibility and validity represent idealizations of correct reasoning in natural language. A chunk of reasoning is correct to the
extent that it corresponds to, or can be regimented by, a valid or deducible argument in a formal language.
When mathematicians and many philosophers engage in deductive reasoning, they occasionally invoke formulas in a formal language to help
disambiguate, or otherwise clarify what they mean. In other words, sometimes formulas in a formal language are used in ordinary reasoning. This
suggests that one might think of a formal language as an addendum to a natural language. Then our present question concerns the relationship between
this addendum and the original language. What do deducibility and validity, as sharply defined on the addendum, tell us about correct deductive
reasoning in general?
Another view is that a formal language is a mathematical model of a natural language in roughly the same sense as, say, a collection of point masses is
a model of a system of physical objects, and the Bohr construction is a model of an atom. In other words, a formal language displays certain features of
natural languages, or idealizations thereof, while ignoring or simplifying other features. The purpose of mathematical models is to shed light on what
they are models of, without claiming that the model is accurate in all respects or that the model should replace what it is a model of. On a view like
this, deducibility and validity represent mathematical models of (perhaps different aspects of) correct reasoning in natural languages. Correct chunks of
deductive reasoning correspond, more or less, to valid or deducible arguments; incorrect chunks of reasoning roughly correspond to invalid or non-
deducible arguments. See, for example, Corcoran [1973], Shapiro [1998], and Cook [2002].
There is no need to adjudicate this matter here. Perhaps the truth lies in a combination of the above options, or maybe some other option is the correct,
or most illuminating one. We raise the matter only to lend some philosophical perspective to the formal treatment that follows.
2. Language
Here we develop the basics of a formal language, or to be precise, a class of formal languages. Again, a formal language is a recursively defined set of
strings on a fixed alphabet. Some aspects of the formal languages correspond to, or have counterparts in, natural languages like English. Technically,
this “counterpart relation” is not part of the formal development, but we will mention it from time to time, to motivate some of the features and results.
2.1 Building blocks
We begin with analogues of singular terms, linguistic items whose function is to denote a person or object. We call these terms. We assume a stock of
individual constants. These are lower-case letters, near the beginning of the Roman alphabet, with or without numerical subscripts:
We envisage a potential infinity of individual constants. In the present system each constant is a single character, and so individual constants do not
have an internal syntax. Thus we have an infinite alphabet. This could be avoided by taking a constant like , for example, to consist of three
characters, a lowercase “ ” followed by a pair of subscript “2”s.
We also assume a stock of individual variables. These are lower-case letters, near the end of the alphabet, with or without numerical subscripts:
In ordinary mathematical reasoning, there are two functions terms need to fulfill. We need to be able to denote specific, but unspecified (or arbitrary)
objects, and sometimes we need to express generality. In our system, we use some constants in the role of unspecified reference and variables to
express generality. Both uses are recapitulated in the formal treatment below. Some logicians employ different symbols for unspecified objects
(sometimes called “individual parameters”) and variables used to express generality.
Constants and variables are the only terms in our formal language, so all of our terms are simple, corresponding to proper names and some uses of
pronouns. We call a term closed if it contains no variables. In general, we use  to represent variables, and  to represent a closed term. Some authors
also introduce function letters, which allow complex terms corresponding to: “ ” and “the wife of Bill Clinton”, or complex terms containing
variables, like “the father of ” and “ ”. Logic books aimed at mathematicians are likely to contain function letters, probably due to the centrality of
functions in mathematical discourse. Books aimed at a more general audience (or at philosophy students), may leave out function letters, since it
simplifies the syntax and theory. We follow the latter route here. This is an instance of a general tradeoff between presenting a system with greater
expressive resources, at the cost of making its formal treatment more complex.
For each natural number , we introduce a stock of -place predicate letters. These are upper-case letters at the beginning or middle of the alphabet. A
superscript indicates the number of places, and there may or may not be a subscript. For example,
are three-place predicate letters. We often omit the superscript, when no confusion will result. We also add a special two-place predicate symbol “ ”
for identity.
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Zero-place predicate letters are sometimes called “sentence letters”. They correspond to free-standing sentences whose internal structure does not
matter. One-place predicate letters, called “monadic predicate letters”, correspond to linguistic items denoting properties, like “being a man”, “being
red”, or “being a prime number”. Two-place predicate letters, called “binary predicate letters”, correspond to linguistic items denoting binary relations,
like “is a parent of” or “is greater than”. Three-place predicate letters correspond to three-place relations, like “lies on a straight line between”. And so
on.
The non-logical terminology of the language consists of its individual constants and predicate letters. The symbol “ ”, for identity, is not a non-logical
symbol. In taking identity to be logical, we provide explicit treatment for it in the deductive system and in the model-theoretic semantics. Most authors
do the same, but there is some controversy over the issue (Quine [1986, Chapter 5]). If  is a set of constants and predicate letters, then we give the
fundamentals of a language  built on this set of non-logical terminology. It may be called the first-order language with identity on . A similar
language that lacks the symbol for identity (or which takes identity to be non-logical) may be called , the first-order language without identity on 
.
2.2 Atomic formulas
If  is an -place predicate letter in , and  are terms of , then  is an atomic formula of . Notice that the terms 
need not be distinct. Examples of atomic formulas include:
The last one is an analogue of a statement that a certain relation  holds between three objects . If  and  are terms, then  is also an
atomic formula of . It corresponds to an assertion that  is identical to .
If an atomic formula has no variables, then it is called an atomic sentence. If it does have variables, it is called open. In the above list of examples, the
first and second are open; the rest are sentences.
2.3 Compound formulas
We now introduce the final items of the lexicon:
We give a recursive definition of a formula of :
1. All atomic formulas of  are formulas of .
2. If  is a formula of , then so is .
A formula corresponding to  thus says that it is not the case that . The symbol “ ” is called “negation”, and is a unary connective.
3. If  and  are formulas of , then so is .
The ampersand “ ” corresponds to the English “and” (when “and” is used to connect sentences). So  can be read “  and ”. The formula 
 is called the “conjunction” of  and .
4. If  and  are formulas of , then so is .
The wedge “ ” corresponds to “either … or … or both”, so  can be read “  or ”. The formula  is called the “disjunction” of  and .
5. 5. If  and  are formulas of , then so is .
The arrow “ ” roughly corresponds to “if … then … ”, so  can be read “if  then ” or “  only if ”.
The symbols “ ”, “ ”, and “ ” are called “binary connectives”, since they serve to “connect” two formulas into one. Some authors introduce 
 as an abbreviation of . The symbol “ ” is an analogue of the locution “if and only if”.
6. If  is a formula of  and  is a variable, then  is a formula of .
The symbol “ ” is called a universal quantifier, and is an analogue of “for all”; so  can be read “for all ”.
7. If  is a formula of  and  is a variable, then  is a formula of .
The symbol “ ” is called an existential quantifier, and is an analogue of “there exists” or “there is”; so  can be read “there is a  such that ”.
8. That’s all folks. That is, all formulas are constructed in accordance with rules (1)–(7).
Clause (8) allows us to do inductions on the complexity of formulas. If a certain property holds of the atomic formulas and is closed under the
operations presented in clauses (2)–(7), then the property holds of all formulas. Here is a simple example:
Theorem 1. Every formula of  has the same number of left and right parentheses. Moreover, each left parenthesis corresponds to a unique
right parenthesis, which occurs to the right of the left parenthesis. Similarly, each right parenthesis corresponds to a unique left parenthesis, which
occurs to the left of the given right parenthesis. If a parenthesis occurs between a matched pair of parentheses, then its mate also occurs within that
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Proof: By clause (8), every formula is built up from the atomic formulas using clauses (2)–(7). The atomic formulas have no parentheses.
Parentheses are introduced only in clauses (3)–(5), and each time they are introduced as a matched set. So at any stage in the construction of a
formula, the parentheses are paired off.
We next define the notion of an occurrence of a variable being free or bound in a formula. A variable that immediately follows a quantifier (as in “ ”
and “ ”) is neither free nor bound. We do not even think of those as occurrences of the variable. All variables that occur in an atomic formula are
free. If a variable occurs free (or bound) in  or in , then that same occurrence is free (or bound) in , and . That is, the
(unary and binary) connectives do not change the status of variables that occur in them. All occurrences of the variable  in  are bound in  and 
. Any free occurrences of  in  are bound by the initial quantifier. All other variables that occur in  are free or bound in  and , as they are
in .
For example, in the formula x(Axy , the occurrences of “ ” in Axy and in the first  are bound by the quantifier. The occurrence of “
” and last occurrence of “ ” are free. In xBx), the “ ” in  is bound by the initial universal quantifier, while the other occurrence of 
is bound by the existential quantifier. The above syntax allows this “double-binding”. Although it does not create any ambiguities (see below), we will
avoid such formulas, as a matter of taste and clarity.
The syntax also allows so-called vacuous binding, as in x . These, too, will be avoided in what follows. Some treatments of logic rule out vacuous
binding and double binding as a matter of syntax. That simplifies some of the treatments below, and complicates others.
Free variables correspond to place-holders, while bound variables are used to express generality. If a formula has no free variables, then it is called a
sentence. If a formula has free variables, it is called open.
2.4 Features of the syntax
Before turning to the deductive system and semantics, we mention a few features of the language, as developed so far. This helps draw the contrast
between formal languages and natural languages like English.
We assume at the outset that all of the categories are disjoint. For example, no connective is also a quantifier or a variable, and the non-logical terms
are not also parentheses or connectives. Also, the items within each category are distinct. For example, the sign for disjunction does not do double-duty
as the negation symbol, and perhaps more significantly, no two-place predicate is also a one-place predicate.
One difference between natural languages like English and formal languages like  is that the latter are not supposed to have any ambiguities.
The policy that the different categories of symbols do not overlap, and that no symbol does double-duty, avoids the kind of ambiguity, sometimes
called “equivocation”, that occurs when a single word has two meanings: “I’ll meet you at the bank.” But there are other kinds of ambiguity. Consider
the English sentence:
John is married, and Mary is single, or Joe is crazy.
It can mean that John is married and either Mary is single or Joe is crazy, or else it can mean that either both John is married and Mary is single, or else
Joe is crazy. An ambiguity like this, due to different ways to parse the same sentence, is sometimes called an “amphiboly”. If our formal language did
not have the parentheses in it, it would have amphibolies. For example, there would be a “formula”  C. Is this supposed to be ,
or is it ? The parentheses resolve what would be an amphiboly.
Can we be sure that there are no other amphibolies in our language? That is, can we be sure that each formula of  can be put together in only
one way? Our next task is to answer this question.
Let us temporarily use the term “unary marker” for the negation symbol  or a quantifier followed by a variable (e.g., .
Lemma 2. Each formula consists of a string of zero or more unary markers followed by either an atomic formula or a formula produced using a
binary connective, via one of clauses (3)–(5).
Proof: We proceed by induction on the complexity of the formula or, in other words, on the number of formation rules that are applied. The Lemma
clearly holds for atomic formulas. Let  be a natural number, and suppose that the Lemma holds for any formula constructed from  or fewer
instances of clauses (2)–(7). Let  be a formula constructed from  instances. The Lemma holds if the last clause used to construct  was either
(3), (4), or (5). If the last clause used to construct  was (2), then  is . Since  was constructed with  instances of the rule, the Lemma holds for
 (by the induction hypothesis), and so it holds for . Similar reasoning shows the Lemma to hold for  if the last clause was (6) or (7). By clause
(8), this exhausts the cases, and so the Lemma holds for , by induction.
Lemma 3. If a formula  contains a left parenthesis, then it ends with a right parenthesis, which matches the leftmost left parenthesis in .
Proof: Here we also proceed by induction on the number of instances of (2)–(7) used to construct the formula. Clearly, the Lemma holds for atomic
formulas, since they have no parentheses. Suppose, then, that the Lemma holds for formulas constructed with  or fewer instances of (2)–(7), and let
 be constructed with  instances. If the last clause applied was (3)–(5), then the Lemma holds since  itself begins with a left parenthesis and
ends with the matching right parenthesis. If the last clause applied was (2), then  is , and the induction hypothesis applies to . Similarly, if the
last clause applied was (6) or (7), then  consists of a quantifier, a variable, and a formula to which we can apply the induction hypothesis. It follows
that the Lemma holds for .
Lemma 4. Each formula contains at least one atomic formula.
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of instances of (2)–(7) used to construct the formula, and we leave it as an exercise.
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Proof: By Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, if  contains a left parenthesis, then the right parenthesis that matches the leftmost left parenthesis in 
comes at the end of , and so the matching right parenthesis is in . So,  has more left parentheses than right parentheses. By Theorem  is not
a formula. So now suppose that  does not contain any left parentheses. By Lemma  consists of a string of zero or more unary markers
followed by either an atomic formula or a formula produced using a binary connective, via one of clauses (3)–(5). If the latter formula was produced
via one of clauses (3)–(5), then it begins with a left parenthesis. Since  does not contain any parentheses, it must be a string of unary markers. But
then  does not contain any atomic formulas, and so by Lemma  is not a formula. The only case left is where  consists of a string of unary
markers followed by an atomic formula, either in the form  or . Again, if  just consisted of unary markers, it would not be a
formula, and so  must consist of the unary markers that start , followed by either  by itself,  by itself, or the predicate letter , and
perhaps some (but not all) of the terms . In the first two cases,  does not contain an atomic formula, by the policy that the categories do
not overlap. Since  is an -place predicate letter, by the policy that the predicate letters are distinct,  is not an -place predicate letter for any 
. So the part of  that consists of  followed by the terms is not an atomic formula. In all of these cases, then,  does not contain an atomic
formula. By Lemma  is not a formula.
We are finally in position to show that there is no amphiboly in our language.
Theorem 6. Let  be any formula of . If  is not atomic, then there is one and only one among (2)–(7) that was the last clause applied to
construct . That is,  could not be produced by two different clauses. Moreover, no formula produced by clauses (2)–(7) is atomic.
Proof: By Clause (8), either  is atomic or it was produced by one of clauses (2)–(7). Thus, the first symbol in  must be either a predicate letter, a
term, a unary marker, or a left parenthesis. If the first symbol in  is a predicate letter or term, then  is atomic. In this case,  was not produced by
any of (2)–(7), since all such formulas begin with something other than a predicate letter or term. If the first symbol in  is a negation sign “ ”, then
was  produced by clause (2), and not by any other clause (since the other clauses produce formulas that begin with either a quantifier or a left
parenthesis). Similarly, if  begins with a universal quantifier, then it was produced by clause (6), and not by any other clause, and if  begins with
an existential quantifier, then it was produced by clause (7), and not by any other clause. The only case left is where  begins with a left parenthesis.
In this case, it must have been produced by one of (3)–(5), and not by any other clause. We only need to rule out the possibility that  was produced
by more than one of (3)–(5). To take an example, suppose that  was produced by (3) and (4). Then  is  and  is also , where 
, and  are themselves formulas. That is,  is the very same formula as . By Theorem  cannot be a proper part of
, nor can  be a proper part of . So  must be the same formula as . But then “ ” must be the same symbol as “ ”, and this contradicts
the policy that all of the symbols are different. So  was not produced by both Clause (3) and Clause (4). Similar reasoning takes care of the other
combinations.
This result is sometimes called “unique readability”. It shows that each formula is produced from the atomic formulas via the various clauses in exactly
one way. If  was produced by clause (2), then its main connective is the initial “ ”. If  was produced by clauses (3), (4), or (5), then its main
connective is the introduced “ ”, “ ”, or “ ”, respectively. If  was produced by clauses (6) or (7), then its main connective is the initial quantifier.
We apologize for the tedious details. We included them to indicate the level of precision and rigor for the syntax.
3. Deduction
We now introduce a deductive system, , for our languages. As above, we define an argument to be a non-empty collection of sentences in the formal
language, one of which is designated to be the conclusion. If there are any other sentences in the argument, they are its premises.[1] By convention, we
use “ ”, “ ”, “ ”, etc, to range over sets of formulas, and we use the letters “ ”, “ ”, “ ”, uppercase or lowercase, with or without subscripts, to
range over single formulas. We write “ ” for the union of  and , and “ ” for the union of  with .
We write an argument in the form , where  is a set of sentences, the premises, and  is a single sentence, the conclusion. Remember that  may
be empty. We write  to indicate that  is deducible from , or, in other words, that the argument  is deducible in . We may write 
to emphasize the deductive system . We write  or  to indicate that  can be deduced (in  from the empty set of premises.
The rules in  are chosen to match logical relations concerning the English analogues of the logical terminology in the language. Again, we define the
deducibility relation by recursion. We start with a rule of assumptions:
(As) If  is a member of , then .
We thus have that ; each premise follows from itself. We next present two clauses for each connective and quantifier. The clauses indicate how
to “introduce” and “eliminate” sentences in which each symbol is the main connective.
First, recall that “ ” is an analogue of the English connective “and”. Intuitively, one can deduce a sentence in the form  if one has deduced 
and one has deduced . Conversely, one can deduce  from  and one can deduce  from :
If  and , then .
If  then ; and if  then .
The name “&I” stands for “&-introduction”; “&E” stands for “&-elimination”.
Since, the symbol “ ” corresponds to the English “or”,  should be deducible from , and  should also be deducible from :
If  then ; if  then .
The elimination rule is a bit more complicated. Suppose that “  or ” is true. Suppose also that  follows from  and that  follows from . One can
reason that if  is true, then  is true. If instead  is true, we still have that  is true. So either way,  must be true.
If  and , then .
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For the next clauses, recall that the symbol, “ ”, is an analogue of the English “if … then … ” construction. If one knows, or assumes  and
also knows, or assumes , then one can conclude . Conversely, if one deduces  from an assumption , then one can conclude that .
If , then .
If  and , then .
This elimination rule is sometimes called “modus ponens”. In some logic texts, the introduction rule is proved as a “deduction theorem”.
Our next clauses are for the negation sign, “ ”. The underlying idea is that a sentence  is inconsistent with its negation . They cannot both be true.
We call a pair of sentences  contradictory opposites. If one can deduce such a pair from an assumption , then one can conclude that  is false,
or, in other words, one can conclude .
If  and , then .
By (As), we have that  and A, A . So by I we have that . However, we do not have the converse yet. Intuitively, 
 corresponds to “it is not the case that it is not the case that” . One might think that this last is equivalent to , and we have a rule to that effect:
(DNE) If , then .
The name DNE stands for “double-negation elimination”. There is some controversy over this inference. It is rejected by philosophers and
mathematicians who do not hold that each meaningful sentence is either true or not true. Intuitionistic logic does not sanction the inference in question
(see, for example Dummett [2000], or the entry on intuitionistic logic, or history of intuitionistic logic), but, again, classical logic does.
To illustrate the parts of the deductive system  presented thus far, we show that :
i. , by (As)
ii. , by (As).
iii. , by I), from (ii).
iv. , by I), from (i) and (iii).
v. , by (As)
vi. , by (As)
vii. , by I), from (vi).
viii. , by I), from (v) and (vii).
ix. , by I), from (iv) and (viii).
x. , by (DNE), from (ix).
The principle  is sometimes called the law of excluded middle. It is not valid in intuitionistic logic.
Let  be a pair of contradictory opposites, and let  be any sentence at all. By (As) we have  and . So by I), 
. So, by (DNE) we have  . That is, anything at all follows from a pair of contradictory opposites. Some logicians introduce
a rule to codify a similar inference:
If  and , then for any sentence 
The inference is sometimes called ex falso quodlibet or, more colorfully, explosion. Some call it “ -elimination”, but perhaps this stretches the notion
of “elimination” a bit. We do not officially include ex falso quodlibet as a separate rule in , but as will be shown below (Theorem 10), each instance
of it is derivable in our system .
Some logicians object to ex falso quodlibet, on the ground that the sentence  may be irrelevant to any of the premises in . Suppose, for example,
that one starts with some premises  about human nature and facts about certain people, and then deduces both the sentence “Clinton had extra-marital
sexual relations” and “Clinton did not have extra-marital sexual relations”. One can perhaps conclude that there is something wrong with the premises 
. But should we be allowed to then deduce anything at all from ? Should we be allowed to deduce “The economy is sound”?
A small minority of logicians, called dialetheists, hold that some contradictions are actually true. For them, ex falso quodlibet is not truth-preserving.
Deductive systems that demur from ex falso quodlibet are called paraconsistent. Most relevant logics are paraconsistent. See the entries on relevance
logic, paraconsistent logic, and dialetheism. Or see Anderson and Belnap [1975], Anderson, Belnap, and Dunn [1992], and Tennant [1997] for fuller
overviews of relevant logic; and Priest [2006],[2006a] for dialetheism. Deep philosophical issues concerning the nature of logical consequence are
involved. Far be it for an article in a philosophy encyclopedia to avoid philosophical issues, but space considerations preclude a fuller treatment of this
issue here. Suffice it to note that the inference ex falso quodlibet is sanctioned in systems of classical logic, the subject of this article. It is essential to
establishing the balance between the deductive system and the semantics (see §5 below).
The next pieces of  are the clauses for the quantifiers. Let  be a formula,  a variable, and  a term (i.e., a variable or a constant). Then define 
to be the result of substituting  for each free occurrence of  in . So, if  is xPxy), then  is xPxy). The last occurrence of  is
not free.
A sentence in the form  is an analogue of the English “for every  holds”. So one should be able to infer  from  for any closed term .
Recall that the only closed terms in our system are constants.
If , then , for any closed term .
The idea here is that if  is true, then  should hold of , no matter what  is.
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The introduction clause for the universal quantifier is a bit more complicated. Suppose that a sentence  contains a closed term , and that  has been
deduced from a set of premises . If the closed term  does not occur in any member of , then  will hold no matter which object  may denote. That
is,  follows.
For any closed term , if , then  provided that  is not in  or .
This rule  corresponds to a common inference in mathematics. Suppose that a mathematician says “let  be a natural number” and goes on to show
that  has a certain property , without assuming anything about  (except that it is a natural number). She then reminds the reader that  is
“arbitrary”, and concludes that  holds for all natural numbers. The condition that the term  not occur in any premise is what guarantees that it is
indeed “arbitrary”. It could be any object, and so anything we conclude about it holds for all objects.
The existential quantifier is an analogue of the English expression “there exists”, or perhaps just “there is”. If we have established (or assumed) that a
given object  has a given property, then it follows that there is something that has that property.
For any closed term , if  then .
The elimination rule for  is not quite as simple:
For any closed term , if  and , then , provided that  does not occur in ,  or .
This elimination rule also corresponds to a common inference. Suppose that a mathematician assumes or somehow concludes that there is a natural
number with a given property . She then says “let  be such a natural number, so that ”, and goes on to establish a sentence , which does not
mention the number . If the derivation of  does not invoke anything about  (other than the assumption that it has the given property , then 
could have been any number that has the property . That is,  is an arbitrary number with property  (this is where we invoke constants which
“denote” arbitrary objects). It does not matter which number  is. Since  does not mention , it follows from the assertion that something has
property . The provisions added to E) are to guarantee that  is “arbitrary”.
The final items are the rules for the identity sign “=”. The introduction rule is about a simple as can be:
, where  is any closed term.
This “inference” corresponds to the truism that everything is identical to itself. The elimination rule corresponds to a principle that if  is identical to ,
then anything true of  is also true of .
For any closed terms  and , if  and , then , where  is obtained from  by replacing one or more occurances
of  with .
The rule  indicates a certain restriction in the expressive resources of our language. Suppose, for example, that Harry is identical to Donald (since
his mischievous parents gave him two names). According to most people’s intuitions, it would not follow from this and “Dick knows that Harry is
wicked” that “Dick knows that Donald is wicked”, for the reason that Dick might not know that Harry is identical to Donald. Contexts like this, in
which identicals cannot safely be substituted for each other, are called “opaque”. We assume that our language  has no opaque contexts.
One final clause completes the description of the deductive system :
(*) That’s all folks.  only if  follows from members of  by the above rules.
Again, this clause allows proofs by induction on the rules used to establish an argument. If a property of arguments holds of all instances of (As) and 
, and if the other rules preserve the property, then every argument that is deducible in  enjoys the property in question.
Before moving on to the model theory for , we pause to note a few features of the deductive system. To illustrate the level of rigor, we begin
with a lemma that if a sentence does not contain a particular closed term, we can make small changes to the set of sentences we prove it from without
problems. We allow ourselves the liberty here of extending some previous notation: for any terms  and , and any formula , we say that  is the
result of replacing all free occurrences of  in  with .
Lemma 7. If  and  differ only in that wherever  contains ,  contains , then for any sentence  not containing  or , if  then
.
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the number of steps in the proof of . Crucial to this proof is the fact that  whenever  does
not contain  or . When the number of steps in the proof of  is one, this means that the last (and only) rule applied is (As) or (=I). Then, since 
does not contain  or , if  we simply apply the same rule ((As) or (=I)) to  to get . Assume that there are  steps in the proof
of , and that Lemma 7 holds for any proof with less than  steps. Suppose that the  rule applied to  was ( ). Then  is , and 
. But then we know that previous steps in the proof include  and , and by induction, we have  and , since
neither  nor  contain  or . So, we simply apply ( ) to  to get  as required. Suppose now that the last step applied in the proof of
 was ( ). Then, at a previous step in the proof of , we know  for some sentence . If  does not contain , then we simply
apply ( ) to  to obtain the desired result. The only complication is if  contains . Then we would have that . But, since 
 is , and  is just , we can just apply ( ) to get  as required. The cases for the other rules are similar.
Theorem 8. The rule of Weakening. If  and , then .
Proof: Again, we proceed by induction on the number of rules that were used to arrive at . Suppose that  is a natural number, and that
the theorem holds for any argument that was derived using fewer than  rules. Suppose that  using exactly  rules. If , then the rule is
either (As) or I). In these cases,  by the same rule. If the last rule applied was (&I), then  has the form , and we have  and 
, with . We apply the induction hypothesis to the deductions of  and , to get  and . and then apply (&I) to the
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result to get . Most of the other cases are exactly like this. Slight complications arise only in the rules I) and E), because there we have
to pay attention to the conditions for the rules.
Suppose that the last rule applied to get  is I). So  is a sentence of the form , and we have  and  does occur in any
member of  or in . The problem is that  may occur in a member of , and so we cannot just invoke the induction hypothesis and apply I) to
the result. So, let  be a term not occurring in any sentence in . Let  be the result of substituting  for all  in . Then, since  does not occur
in , . So, the induction hypothesis gives us , and we know that  does not contain , so we can apply ( ) to get .
But  does not contain  or , so  by Lemma 7.
Suppose that the last rule applied was E), we have  and , with  being , and  not in ,  or . If  does not occur
free in , we apply the induction hypothesis to get , and then E) to end up with . If  does occur free in , then we follow a
similar proceedure to , using Lemma 7.
Theorem 8 allows us to add on premises at will. It follows that  if and only if there is a subset  such that . Some systems of
relevant logic do not have weakening, nor does substructural logic (See the entries on relevance logic, substructural logics, and linear logic).
By clause (*), all derivations are established in a finite number of steps. So we have
Theorem 9.  if and only if there is a finite  such that .
Theorem 10. The rule of ex falso quodlibet is a “derived rule” of : if  and , then , for any sentence .
Proof: Suppose that  and . Then by Theorem , and . So by I), . By (DNE), .
Theorem 11. The rule of Cut. If  and , then .
Proof: Suppose  and . We proceed by induction on the number of rules used to establish . Suppose that  is a natural
number, and that the theorem holds for any argument that was derived using fewer than  rules. Suppose that  was derived using exactly 
rules. If the last rule used was I), then  is also an instance of I). If  is an instance of (As), then either  is , or  is a
member of . In the former case, we have  by supposition, and get  by Weakening (Theorem 8). In the latter case,  is
itself an instance of (As). Suppose that  was obtained using (&E). Then we have . The induction hypothesis gives us 
, and (&E) produces . The remaining cases are similar.
Theorem 11 allows us to chain together inferences. This fits the practice of establishing theorems and lemmas and then using those theorems and
lemmas later, at will. The cut principle is, some think, essential to reasoning. In some logical systems, the cut principle is a deep theorem; in others it is
invalid. The system here was designed, in part, to make the proof of Theorem 11 straightforward.
If , then we say that the sentence  is a deductive consequence of the set of sentences , and that the argument  is deductively valid. A
sentence  is a logical theorem, or a deductive logical truth, if . That is,  is a logical theorem if it is a deductive consequence of the empty set. A
set  of sentences is consistent if there is no sentence  such that  and . That is, a set is consistent if it does not entail a pair of
contradictory opposite sentencess.
Theorem 12. A set  is consistent if and only if there is a sentence  such that it is not the case that .
Proof: Suppose that  is consistent and let  be any sentence. Then either it is not the case that  or it is not the case that . For the
converse, suppose that  is inconsistent and let  be any sentence. We have that there is a sentence such that both  and . By ex falso
quodlibet (Theorem 10), .
Define a set  of sentences of the language  to be maximally consistent if  is consistent and for every sentence  of , if  is not in ,
then  is inconsistent. In other words,  is maximally consistent if  is consistent, and adding any sentence in the language not already in  renders
it inconsistent. Notice that if  is maximally consistent then  if and only if  is in .
Theorem 13. The Lindenbaum Lemma. Let  be any consistent set of sentences of  Then there is a set  of sentences of  such
that  and  is maximally consistent.
Proof: Although this theorem holds in general, we assume here that the set  of non-logical terminology is either finite or denumerably infinite
(i.e., the size of the natural numbers, usually called . It follows that there is an enumeration  of the sentences of , such that every
sentence of  eventually occurs in the list. Define a sequence of sets of sentences, by recursion, as follows:  is ; for each natural number 
, if  is consistent, then let . Otherwise, let . Let  be the union of all of the sets . Intuitively, the idea is to go
through the sentences of , throwing each one into  if doing so produces a consistent set. Notice that each  is consistent. Suppose that 
is inconsistent. Then there is a sentence  such that  and . By Theorem 9 and Weakening (Theorem 8), there is finite subset  of 
such that  and . Because  is finite, there is a natural number  such that every member of  is in . So, by Weakening again, 
 and . So  is inconsistent, which contradicts the construction. So  is consistent. Now suppose that a sentence  is not in . We
have to show that  is inconsistent. The sentence  must occur in the aforementioned list of sentences; say that  is . Since  is not in ,
then it is not in . This happens only if  is inconsistent. So a pair of contradictory opposites can be deduced from . By
Weakening, a pair of contradictory opposites can be deduced from . So  is inconsistent. Thus,  is maximally consistent.
Notice that this proof uses a principle corresponding to the law of excluded middle. In the construction of , we assumed that, at each stage, either 
is consistent or it is not. Intuitionists, who demur from excluded middle, do not accept the Lindenbaum lemma.
4. Semantics
⊢ ϕΓ2 (∀ (∃
⊢ ϕΓ1 (∀ ϕ ∀vθ ⊢ θ(v|t)Γ1 t
Γ1 θ t Γ2 (∀
t′ Γ2 Γ
′ t′ t Γ2 t
Γ1 ⊆Γ1 Γ
′ ⊢ θ(v|t)Γ′ Γ′ t ∀I ⊢ ∀vθΓ′
∀vθ t t′ ⊢ ∀vθΓ2
(∃ ⊢ ∃vθΓ3 ,θ(v|t) ⊢ ϕΓ4 Γ1 ,Γ3 Γ4 t ϕ Γ4 θ t
Γ2 ⊢ ∃vθΓ2 (∃ ⊢ ϕΓ2 t Γ2
∀I
Γ ⊢ ϕ ⊆ ΓΓ′ ⊢ ϕΓ′
Γ ⊢ ϕ ⊆ ΓΓ′ ⊢ ϕΓ′
D ⊢ θΓ1 ⊢ ¬θΓ2 , ⊢ ψΓ1 Γ2 ψ
⊢ θΓ1 ⊢ ¬θΓ2 8, ,¬ψ ⊢ θΓ1 ,¬ψ ⊢ ¬θΓ2 (¬ , ⊢ ¬¬ψΓ1 Γ2 , ⊢ ψΓ1 Γ2
⊢ ψΓ1 ,ψ ⊢ θΓ2 , ⊢ θΓ1 Γ2
⊢ ψΓ1 ,ψ ⊢ θΓ2 ,ψ ⊢ θΓ2 n
n ,ψ ⊢ θΓ2 n
(= , ⊢ θΓ1 Γ2 (= ,ψ ⊢ θΓ2 θ ψ θ
Γ2 ⊢ θΓ1 , ⊢ θΓ1 Γ2 , ⊢ θΓ1 Γ2
,ψ ⊢ θΓ2 ,ψ ⊢ (θ& ϕ)Γ2
, ⊢ (θ& ϕ)Γ1 Γ2 , ⊢ θΓ1 Γ2
Γ θ⊢D θ Γ ⟨Γ,θ⟩
θ θ⊢D θ
Γ θ Γ θ⊢D Γ ¬θ⊢D
Γ θ Γ ⊢ θ
Γ θ Γ ⊢ θ Γ ⊢ ¬θ
Γ ψ Γ ⊢ θ Γ ⊢ ¬θ
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ L1K= Γ θ L1K= θ Γ
Γ,θ Γ Γ Γ
Γ Γ ⊢ θ θ Γ
Γ L1K=. Γ′ L1K=
Γ ⊆ Γ′ Γ′
K
)ℵ0 , ,…θ0 θ1 L1K=
L1K= Γ0 Γ
n ,Γn θn = ,Γn+1 Γn θn =Γn+1 Γn Γ
′ Γn
L1K= Γ′ Γn Γ′
θ ⊢ θΓ′ ⊢ ¬θΓ′ Γ′′ Γ′
⊢ θΓ′′ ⊢ ¬θΓ′′ Γ′′ n Γ′′ Γn
⊢ θΓn ⊢ ¬θΓn Γn Γ′ θ Γ′
,θΓ′ θ θ θm θm Γ′
Γm+1 ,Γm θm ,Γm θm
,Γ′ θm ,Γ′ θm Γ′
Γ′ Γn
Let  be a set of non-logical terminology. An interpretation for the language  is a structure , where  is a non-empty set, called the
domain-of-discourse, or simply the domain, of the interpretation, and  is an interpretation function. Informally, the domain is what we interpret the
language  to be about. It is what the variables range over. The interpretation function assigns appropriate extensions to the non-logical terms. In
particular,
If  is a constant in , then  is a member of the domain .
Thus we assume that every constant denotes something. Systems where this is not assumed are called free logics (see the entry on free logic).
Continuing,
If  is a zero-place predicate letter in , then  is a truth value, either truth or falsehood.
If  is a one-place predicate letter in , then  is a subset of . Intuitively,  is the set of members of the domain that the predicate 
holds of. If  represents “red”, then  is the set of red members of the domain.
If  is a two-place predicate letter in , then  is a set of ordered pairs of members of . Intuitively,  is the set of pairs of members of the
domain that the relation  holds between. If  represents “love”, then  is the set of pairs  such that  and  are the members of the
domain for which  loves .
In general, if S  is an -place predicate letter in , then  is a set of ordered -tuples of members of .
Define  to be a variable-assignment, or simply an assignment, on an interpretation , if  is a function from the variables to the domain  of . The
role of variable-assignments is to assign denotations to the free variables of open formulas. (In a sense, the quantifiers determine the “meaning” of the
bound variables.)
Let  be a term of . We define the denotation of  in  under , in terms of the interpretation function and variable-assignment:
If  is a constant, then  is , and if  is a variable, then  is .
That is, the interpretation  assigns denotations to the constants, while the variable-assignment assigns denotations to the (free) variables. If the
language contained function symbols, the denotation function would be defined by recursion.
We now define a relation of satisfaction between interpretations, variable-assignments, and formulas of . If  is a formula of  is an
interpretation for , and  is a variable-assignment on , then we write  for  satisfies  under the assignment . The idea is that 
 is an analogue of “  comes out true when interpreted as in  via ”.
We proceed by recursion on the complexity of the formulas of .
If  and  are terms, then  if and only if  is the same as .
This is about as straightforward as it gets. An identity  comes out true if and only if the terms  and  denote the same thing.
If  is a zero-place predicate letter in , then  if and only if  is truth.
If S  is an -place predicate letter in  and  are terms, then  if and only if the -tuple  is in 
.
This takes care of the atomic formulas. We now proceed to the compound formulas of the language, more or less following the meanings of the
English counterparts of the logical terminology.
 if and only if it is not the case that .
 if and only if both  and .
 if and only if either  or .
 if and only if either it is not the case that , or .
 if and only if , for every assignment  that agrees with  except possibly at the variable .
The idea here is that  comes out true if and only if  comes out true no matter what is assigned to the variable . The final clause is similar.
 if and only if , for some assignment  that agrees with  except possibly at the variable .
So  comes out true if there is an assignment to  that makes  true.
Theorem 6, unique readability, assures us that this definition is coherent. At each stage in breaking down a formula, there is exactly one clause to be
applied, and so we never get contradictory verdicts concerning satisfaction.
As indicated, the role of variable-assignments is to give denotations to the free variables. We now show that variable-assignments play no other role.
Theorem 14. For any formula , if  and  agree on the free variables in , then  if and only if .
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Proof: We proceed by induction on the complexity of the formula . The theorem clearly holds if  is atomic, since in those cases only the values of
the variable-assignments at the variables in  figure in the definition. Assume, then, that the theorem holds for all formulas less complex than . And
suppose that  and  agree on the free variables of . Assume, first, that  is a negation, . Then, by the induction hypothesis,  if and
only if . So, by the clause for negation,  if and only if . The cases where the main connective in  is binary are
also straightforward. Suppose that  is , and that . Then there is an assignment  that agrees with  except possibly at  such that
. Let  be the assignment that agrees with  on the free variables not in  and agrees with  on the others. Then, by the induction
hypothesis, . Notice that  agrees with  on every variable except possibly . So . The converse is the same, and the case
where  begins with a universal quantifier is similar.
By Theorem 14, if  is a sentence, and , are any two variable-assignments, then  if and only if . So we can just write 
 if  for some, or all, variable-assignments . So we define
 where  is a sentence just in case  for all variable assignments .
In this case, we call  a model of .
Suppose that  are two sets of non-logical terms. If  is an interpretation of , then we define the restriction of  to  be
the interpretation  such that  is the restriction of  to . That is,  and  have the same domain and agree on the non-logical
terminology in . A straightforward induction establishes the following:
Theorem 15. If  is the restriction of  to , then for every sentence  of ,  if and only if .
Theorem 16. If two interpretations  and  have the same domain and agree on all of the non-logical terminology of a sentence , then 
if and only if .
In short, the satisfaction of a sentence  only depends on the domain of discourse and the interpretation of the non-logical terminology in .
We say that an argument  is semantically valid, or just valid, written , if for every interpretation  of the language, if , for every
member  of , then . If , we also say that  is a logical consequence, or semantic consequence, or model-theoretic consequence of .
The definition corresponds to the informal idea that an argument is valid if it is not possible for its premises to all be true and its conclusion false. Our
definition of logical consequence also sanctions the common thesis that a valid argument is truth-preserving--to the extent that satisfaction represents
truth. Officially, an argument in  is valid if its conclusion comes out true under every interpretation of the language in which the premises are
true. Validity is the model-theoretic counterpart to deducibility.
A sentence  is logically true, or valid, if , for every interpretation . A sentence is logically true if and only if it is a consequence of the
empty set. If  is logically true, then for any set  of sentences, . Logical truth is the model-theoretic counterpart of theoremhood.
A sentence  is satisfiable if there is an interpretation  such that . That is,  is satisfiable if there is an interpretation that satisfies it. A set 
of sentences is satisfiable if there is an interpretation  such that , for every sentence  in . If  is a set of sentences and if  for each
sentence  in , then we say that  is a model of . So a set of sentences is satisfiable if it has a model. Satisfiability is the model-theoretic
counterpart to consistency.
Notice that  if and only if the set  is not satisfiable. It follows that if a set  is not satisfiable, then if  is any sentence, . This is a
model-theoretic counterpart to ex falso quodlibet (see Theorem 10). We have the following, as an analogue to Theorem 12:
Theorem 17. Let  be a set of sentences. The following are equivalent: (a)  is satisfiable; (b) there is no sentence  such that both  and 
; (c) there is some sentence  such that it is not the case that .
Proof: (a) (b): Suppose that  is satisfiable and let  be any sentence. There is an interpretation  such that  for every member  of .
By the clause for negations, we cannot have both  and . So either  is not valid or else  is not valid. (b) (c): This is
immediate. (c) (a): Suppose that it is not the case that . Then there is an interpretation  such that , for every sentence  in  and it
is not the case that . A fortiori,  satisfies every member of , and so  is satisfiable.
5. Meta-theory
We now present some results that relate the deductive notions to their model-theoretic counterparts. The first one is probably the most straightforward.
We motivated both the various rules of the deductive system  and the various clauses in the definition of satisfaction in terms of the meaning of the
English counterparts to the logical terminology (more or less, with the same simplifications in both cases). So one would expect that an argument is
deducible, or deductively valid, only if it is semantically valid.
Theorem 18. Soundness. For any sentence  and set  of sentences, if , then .
Proof: We proceed by induction on the number of clauses used to establish . So let  be a natural number, and assume that the theorem holds
for any argument established as deductively valid with fewer than  steps. And suppose that  was established using exactly  steps. If the last
rule applied was I) then  is a sentence in the form , and so  is logically true. A fortiori, . If the last rule applied was (As), then  is a
member of , and so of course any interpretation that satisfies every member of  also satisfies . Suppose the last rule applied is (&I). So  has the
form , and we have  and , with . The induction hypothesis gives us  and . Suppose that 
satisfies every member of . Then  satisfies every member of , and so  satisfies . Similarly,  satisfies every member of , and so 
satisfies . Thus, by the clause for “ ” in the definition of satisfaction,  satisfies . So .
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We need to show that . By the induction hypothesis, we have that  and . Let  be an interpretation such that 
makes every member of  true. So,  makes every member of  and  true. Then  for all variable assignments , so there is an 
such that . Let  differ from  only in that . Then,  and  since  does not occur in  or 
. So, . Since  does not occur in  and  differs from  only with respect to , . Since  is a sentence,  doesn't
matter, so  as desired. Notice the role of the restrictions on E) here. The other cases are about as straightforward.
Corollary 19. Let  be a set of sentences. If  is satisfiable, then  is consistent.
Proof: Suppose that  is satisfiable. So let  be an interpretation such that  satisfies every member of . Assume that  is inconsistent. Then
there is a sentence  such that  and . By soundness (Theorem 18),  and . So we have that  and . But this
is impossible, given the clause for negation in the definition of satisfaction.
Even though the deductive system  and the model-theoretic semantics were developed with the meanings of the logical terminology in mind, one
should not automatically expect the converse to soundness (or Corollary 19) to hold. For all we know so far, we may not have included enough rules of
inference to deduce every valid argument. The converses to soundness and Corollary 19 are among the most important and influential results in
mathematical logic. We begin with the latter.
Theorem 20. Completeness. Gödel [1930]. Let  be a set of sentences. If  is consistent, then  is satisfiable.
Proof: The proof of completeness is rather complex. We only sketch it here. Let  be a consistent set of sentences of . Again, we assume for
simplicity that the set  of non-logical terminology is either finite or countably infinite (although the theorem holds even if  is uncountable). The
task at hand is to find an interpretation  such that  satisfies every member of . Consider the language obtained from  by adding a
denumerably infinite stock of new individual constants  We stipulate that the constants, , are all different from each other and
none of them occur in . One interesting feature of this construction, due to Leon Henkin, is that we build an interpretation of the language from the
language itself, using some of the constants as members of the domain of discourse. Let  be an enumeration of the formulas of the
expanded language with at most one free variable, so that each formula with at most one free variable occurs in the list eventually. Define a
sequence  of sets of sentences (of the expanded language) by recursion as follows: ; and , where 
 is the first constant in the above list that does not occur in  or in any member of . The underlying idea here is that if is true, then  is to
be one such . Let  be the union of the sets .
We sketch a proof that  is consistent. Suppose that  is inconsistent. By Theorem 9, there is a finite subset of  that is inconsistent, and so one of
the sets  is inconsistent. By hypothesis,  is consistent. Let  be the smallest number such that  is consistent, but 
 is inconsistent. By I), we have that
By ex falso quodlibet (Theorem 10), . So by I), . From this and (1), we have 
, by I), and by (DNE) we have
By (As), . So by I), . From this and (1), we have , by I). Let 
 be a term that does not occur in  or in any member of . By uniform substitution of  for , we can turn the derivation of  into 
. By I), we have
By (As) we have  and by E) we have . So  is inconsistent. Let  be any
sentence of the language. By ex falso quodlibet (Theorem 10), we have that  and . So with (2), we
have that  and , by E). By Cut (Theorem 11),  and . So  is inconsistent,
contradicting the assumption. So  is consistent.
Applying the Lindenbaum Lemma (Theorem 13), let  be a maximally consistent set of sentences (of the expanded language) that contains . So,
of course,  contains . We can now define an interpretation  such that  satisfies every member of .
If we did not have a sign for identity in the language, we would let the domain of  be the collection of new constants . But as it is,
there may be a sentence in the form , with , in . If so, we cannot have both  and  in the domain of the interpretation (as they are
distinct constants). So we define the domain  of  to be the set  | there is no  such that  is in . In other words, a constant  is
in the domain of  if  does not declare it to be identical to an earlier constant in the list. Notice that for each new constant , there is exactly one
 such that  is in  and the sentence  is in .
We now define the interpretation function . Let  be any constant in the expanded language. By I) and I), , and so 
. By the construction of , there is a sentence in the form  in . We have that  is in . As above,
there is exactly one  in  such that  is in . Let . Notice that if  is a constant in the domain , then (c . That is each 
in  denotes itself.
Let  be a zero-place predicate letter in . Then  is truth if  is in  and  is falsehood otherwise. Let  be a one-place predicate letter
in . Then  is the set of constants c  is in  and the sentence  is in . Let  be a binary predicate letter in . Then  is the set of
pairs of constants  is in  is in , and the sentence  is in . Three-place predicates, etc. are interpreted similarly. In effect, 
interprets the non-logical terminology as they are in .
The variable assignments are similar. If  is a variable, then , where  is the first constant in  such that  is in .
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The final item in this proof is a lemma that for every formula  in the expanded language,  if and only if  is in . This proceeds by
induction on the complexity of . The case where  is atomic follows from the definitions of  (i.e., the domain  and the interpretation function ,
and the variable assignment ). The other cases follow from the various clauses in the definition of satisfaction.
Since , we have that  satisfies every member of . By Theorem 15, the restriction of  to the original language  and  also
satisfies every member of . Thus  is satisfiable.
A converse to Soundness (Theorem 18) is a straightforward corollary:
Theorem 21. For any sentence  and set  of sentences, if , then .
Proof: Suppose that . Then there is no interpretation  such that M satisfies every member of  but does not satisfy . So the set  is not
satisfiable. By Completeness (Theorem 20),  is inconsistent. So there is a sentence  such that  and . By I), ,
and by (DNE) .
Our next item is a corollary of Theorem 9, Soundness (Theorem 18), and Completeness:
Corollary 22. Compactness. A set  of sentences is satisfiable if and only if every finite subset of  is satisfiable.
Proof: If  satisfies every member of , then  satisfies every member of each finite subset of . For the converse, suppose that  is not
satisfiable. Then we show that some finite subset of  is not satisfiable. By Completeness (Theorem 20),  is inconsistent. By Theorem 9 (and
Weakening), there is a finite subset  such that  is inconsistent. By Corollary  is not satisfiable.
Soundness and completeness together entail that an argument is deducible if and only if it is valid, and a set of sentences is consistent if and only if it is
satisfiable. So we can go back and forth between model-theoretic and proof-theoretic notions, transferring properties of one to the other. Compactness
holds in the model theory because all derivations use only a finite number of premises.
Recall that in the proof of Completeness (Theorem 20), we made the simplifying assumption that the set  of non-logical constants is either finite or
denumerably infinite. The interpretation we produced was itself either finite or denumerably infinite. Thus, we have the following:
Corollary 23. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Let  be a satisfiable set of sentences of the language . If  is either finite or denumerably
infinite, then  has a model whose domain is either finite or denumerably infinite.
In general, let  be a satisfiable set of sentences of , and let  be the larger of the size of  and denumerably infinite. Then  has a model
whose domain is at most size .
There is a stronger version of Corollary 23. Let  and  be interpretations of the language . Define  to be a
submodel of  if  for each constant , and  is the restriction of  to . For example, if  is a binary relation letter in ,
then for all  in , the pair  is in  if and only if  is in . If we had included function letters among the non-logical terminology,
we would also require that  be closed under their interpretations in . Notice that if  is a submodel of , then any variable-assignment on 
is also a variable-assignment on .
Say that two interpretations  are equivalent if one of them is a submodel of the other, and for any formula of the
language and any variable-assignment  on the submodel,  if and only if . Notice that if two interpretations are equivalent, then
they satisfy the same sentences.
Theorem 25. Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Let  be an interpretation of the language . Let  be any subset of ,
and let  be the maximum of the size of , the size of , and denumerably infinite. Then there is a submodel  of  such that (1) 
is not larger than , and (2)  and  are equivalent. In particular, if the set  of non-logical terminology is either finite or denumerably infinite,
then any interpretation has an equivalent submodel whose domain is either finite or denumerably infinite.
Proof: Like completeness, this proof is complex, and we rest content with a sketch. The downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem invokes the axiom
of choice, and indeed, is equivalent to the axiom of choice (see the entry on the axiom of choice). So let  be a choice function on the powerset of 
, so that for each non-empty subset  is a member of . We stipulate that if  is the empty set, then  is .
Let  be a variable-assignment on , let  be a formula of , and let  be a variable. Define the -witness of  over s, written , as
follows: Let  be the set of all elements  such that there is a variable-assignment  on  that agrees with  on every variable except possibly 
, such that , and . Then . Notice that if , then  is the set of elements of the domain that can go for
 in . Indeed,  if and only if  is non-empty. So if , then  (i.e.,  is a chosen element of the domain that can go
for  in . In a sense, it is a “witness” that verifies .
If  is a non-empty subset of the domain , then define a variable-assignment  to be an -assignment if for all variables  is in . That is,  is
an -assignment if  assigns an element of  to each variable. Define , the Skolem-hull of , to be the set:
That is, the Skolem-Hull of  is the set  together with every -witness of every formula over every -assignment. Roughly, the idea is to start with 
and then throw in enough elements to make each existentially quantified formula true. But we cannot rest content with the Skolem-hull, however.
Once we throw the “witnesses” into the domain, we need to deal with  assignments. In effect, we need a set which is its own Skolem-hull, and
also contains the given subset .
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We define a sequence of non-empty sets  as follows: if the given subset  of  is empty and there are no constants in , then let  be 
, the choice function applied to the entire domain; otherwise let  be the union of  and the denotations under  of the constants in . For
each natural number  is . Finally, let  be the union of the sets , and let  be the restriction of  to . Our interpretation is 
.
Clearly,  is a subset of , and so  is a submodel of . Let  be the maximum of the size of , the size of , and denumerably infinite. A
calculation reveals that the size of  is at most , based on the fact that there are at most -many formulas, and thus, at most -many witnesses at
each stage. Notice, incidentally, that this calculation relies on the fact that a denumerable union of sets of size at most  is itself at most . This also
relies on the axiom of choice.
The final item is to show that  is equivalent to : For every formula  and every variable-assignment  on ,
The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of . Unfortunately, space constraints require that we leave this step as an exercise.
Another corollary to Compactness (Corollary 22) is the opposite of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem:
Theorem 26. Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Let  be any set of sentences of  such that for each natural number , there is an
interpretation , and an assignment  on , such that  has at least  elements, and  satisfies every member of . In other
words,  is satisfiable and there is no finite upper bound to the size of the interpretations that satisfy every member of . Then for any infinite
cardinal , there is an interpretation  and assignment  on , such that the size of  is at least  and  satisfies every member of .
In particular, if  is a set of sentences, then it has arbitrarily large models.
Proof: Add a collection of new constants , of size , to the language, so that if  is a constant in , then  is different from , and if 
, then  is a different constant than . Consider the set of formulas  consisting of  together with the set . That
is,  consists of  together with statements to the effect that any two different new constants denote different objects. Let  be any finite subset of 
, and let  be the number of new constants that occur in . Then expand the interpretation  to an interpretation  of the new language, by
interpreting each of the new constants in  as a different member of the domain . By hypothesis, there are enough members of  to do this.
One can interpret the other new constants at will. So  is a restriction of . By hypothesis (and Theorem 15),  satisfies every member
of . Also  satisfies the members of  that are in . So  satisfies every member of . By compactness, there is
an interpretation  and an assignment  on  such that  satisfies every member of . Since  contains every member of 
, the domain  of  must be of size at least , since each of the new constants must have a different denotation. By Theorem
15, the restriction of  to the original language  satisfies every member of , with the variable-assignment .
Combined, the proofs of the downward and upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that for any satisfiable set  of sentences, if there is no finite
bound on the models of , then for any infinite cardinal , there is a model of  whose domain has size exactly . Moreover, if  is any
interpretation whose domain is infinite, then for any infinite cardinal , there is an interpretation  whose domain has size exactly  such that 
and  are equivalent.
These results indicate a weakness in the expressive resources of first-order languages like . No satisfiable set of sentences can guarantee that its
models are all denumerably infinite, nor can any satisfiable set of sentences guarantee that its models are uncountable. So in a sense, first-order
languages cannot express the notion of “denumerably infinite”, at least not in the model theory. (See the entry on second-order and higher-order logic.)
Let  be any set of sentences in a first-order language , where  includes terminology for arithmetic, and assume that every member of  is
true of the natural numbers. We can even let  be the set of all sentences in  that are true of the natural numbers. Then  has uncountable
models, indeed models of any infinite cardinality. Such interpretations are among those that are sometimes called unintended, or non-standard models
of arithmetic. Let  be any set of first-order sentences that are true of the real numbers, and let  be any first-order axiomatization of set theory. Then
if  and  are satisfiable (in infinite interpretations), then each of them has denumerably infinite models. That is, any first-order, satisfiable set theory
or theory of the real numbers, has (unintended) models the size of the natural numbers. This is despite the fact that a sentence (seemingly) stating that
the universe is uncountable is provable in most set-theories. This situation, known as the Skolem paradox, has generated much discussion, but we must
refer the reader elsewhere for a sample of it (see the entry on Skolem’s paradox and Shapiro 1996).
6. The One Right Logic?
Logic and reasoning go hand in hand. We say that someone has reasoned poorly about something if they have not reasoned logically, or that an
argument is bad because it is not logically valid. To date, research has been devoted to exactly just what types of logical systems are appropriate for
guiding our reasoning. Traditionally, classical logic has been the logic suggested as the ideal for guiding reasoning (for example, see Quine [1986],
Resnik [1996] or Rumfitt [2015]). For this reason, classical logic has often been called “the one right logic”. See Priest [2006a] for a description of
how being the best reasoning-guiding logic could make a logic the one right logic.
That classical logic has been given as the answer to which logic ought to guide reasoning is not unexpected. It has rules which are more or less
intuitive, and is surprisingly simple for how strong it is. Plus, it is both sound and complete, which is an added bonus. There are some issues, though.
As indicated in Section 5, there are certain expressive limitations to classical logic. Thus, much literature has been written challenging this status quo.
This literature in general stems from three positions. The first is that classical logic is not reason-guiding because some other single logic is. Examples
of this type of argument can be found in Brouwer [1949], Heyting [1956] and Dummett [2000] who argue that intuitionistic logic is correct, and
Anderson and Belnap [1975], who argue relevance logic is correct, among many others. Further, some people propose that an extension of classical
logic which can express the notion of “denumerably infinite” (see Shapiro [1991]). The second objection to the claim that classical logic is the one
right logic comes from a different perspective: logical pluralists claim that classical logic is not the (single) one right logic, because more than one
logic is right. See Beall and Restall [2006] and Shapiro [2014] for examples of this type of view (see also the entry on logical pluralism). Finally, the
last objection to the claim that classical logic is the one right logic is that logic(s) is not reasoning-guiding, and so there is no one right logic.
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Suffice it to say that, though classical logic has traditionally been thought of as “the one right logic”, this is not accepted by everyone. An interesting
feature of these debates, though, is that they demonstrate clearly the strengths and weaknesses of various logics (including classical logic) when it
comes to capturing reasoning.
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